Hidden-city ticket is an interesting airline ticket pricing phenomenon. It occurs when an itinerary connecting at an intermediate city is less expensive than a ticket from the origin to the intermediate city. In such a case, passengers traveling to the intermediate city will have the incentive to pretend to be traveling to the final destination, deplane at the connection point and forgo the unused portion of the ticket. Hidden-city opportunities are not uncommon nowadays.
Introduction
Since the deregulation of the airline industry in 1970s, airlines have employed more and more sophisticated pricing strategies to strive for more revenues from passengers. Many interesting pricing phenomena are frequently observed. Among these is the "hidden-city" ticketing opportunity in which the price quoted by an airline for an itinerary from city A to city B is more expensive than the price quoted by the same airline for an itinerary from city A to city C with a connection at city B. When such a situation happens, travelers from A to B will have an incentive to pretend to be traveling from A to C, deplane at city B and forgo the unused portion of the ticket. In this case, we call city B the "hidden-city". An example of a hidden-city ticketing opportunity is illustrated as follows 1 :
A one-way flight from San Francisco (SFO) to Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) on Feb. 25th, 2011 costs $597 for American Airlines. However, if one searches for a one-way flight from SFO to Tempa (TPA) for the same day, the fare is only $229 for American Airlines with a connection at DFW (we call DFW the hidden-city in this case).
This pricing may not make sense to many travelers. How can it be that the entire flight is less expensive than a shorter segment of the flight? However, this phenomenon prevails in current airlines' pricing, especially in the modern hub-and-spoke airline networks (A hub-and-spoke network consists hub cities and spoke cities. Itineraries between spoke cities are connected at a certain hub. This flight network is most adopted by major airlines to provide more services and increase the transportation efficiency, we will formally define this term in Definition 4) . According to an investigation paper GAO (2001) , about 17% of the markets among major US airlines (in all fare classes) exhibit hidden-city ticketing opportunities (which they defined in GAO (2001) as 100 dollars' difference in high fare class and 50 dollars' difference in low fare class). Since such a ticketing strategy hurts airlines' revenues and competitive positions, most airlines explicitly prohibit the use of hidden-city ticketing in the terms and conditions of a ticket. However, travelers are seldom adversely sanctioned for such practice because it is difficult and costly for airlines to pursue an individual passenger. Moreover, the usage of such practice is not yet sufficiently widespread to justify expensive controls.
Although it is debatable whether the hidden-city ticketing practice is legal or moral, it is very important to understand why such seemingly unreasonable pricing policies are established and persist; the cost to the airlines if hidden-city ticketing is completely admitted and used by passengers whenever possible; and the long term impact it may have on both the airlines and travelers. Understanding these issues is fundamental for decision makers involved, such as law makers, airline executives as well as travelers.
For this purpose, we consider a multi-period flight network revenue management model. At each period, the airline decides which itinerary (connection city) and price to offer for each origindestination (O-D) pair. We show that the hidden-city ticketing opportunity could exist in this model when there is a significant difference in price elasticity of demand on related itineraries. We also quantify the magnitude of the difference for this phenomenon to happen. Our finding, being consistent with discussions in previous literatures, indicates that different level of competition on different routes is the main factor that causes this phenomenon.
After understanding the cause of hidden-city opportunity, we study the cost of such ticketing practice for the airlines if every passenger takes advantage of it whenever possible. First we show that if the airlines do not react to this practice, their revenues could be severely hurt. Then we establish a modified dynamic programming decision model for the airlines in which every passenger takes advantage of all possible hidden-city ticketing opportunities. We show that in this model, the optimal strategies of the airlines will no longer contain any hidden-city opportunities, but even the optimal strategies cannot fully mitigate the negative revenue effect of such ticketing policies. We show that an upper bound on the revenue losses can be established at half of its original optimal revenue if the airline uses a hub-and-spoke network. We also show that this upper bound is actually tight. Therefore, admitting hidden-city ticketing will be quite detrimental to airlines' revenues and thus from the airlines' point of view, they do have a strong incentive to legally or contractually forbid such ticketing practice.
On the other hand, although the airlines have a strong incentive to prohibit hidden-city ticketing, passengers may find it attractive since it instantly saves their money. However, in a long run, using the hidden-city ticketing may also hurt the passengers through the externalities that the behavior causes. For a hub-and-spoke flight network, if hidden-city ticketing is fully admitted in certain period and all passengers take advantage of such opportunities, the optimal fares to the spoke cities will increase in that period. The rises in those fares not only immediately hurt those who travel to the spoke cities, but also significantly reduce the profitability of airlines for serving those spoke cities which in turn may result in a reduction or suspension in service towards those cities. Therefore, our result suggests that in the long run, the use of hidden-city ticketing may also decrease travelers' benefits, creating a lose-lose situation.
Our work is based on a dynamic programming framework for network revenue management problems. For the most part of this paper, we consider an exogenous competition environment. We justify this model by also considering an endogenous competition model and argue that our model is a special case when all other competitors use their equilibrium strategies. Therefore, this approach, although not entirely perfect, is a good approximation of the pricing game occurred in real practice.
There have been extensive researches on the flight revenue management problems in the past twenty years, see Elmaghraby and Keskinocak (2003) , Talluri and van Ryzin (2005) , Bitran and Caldentey (2003) and references therein for a comprehensive review on this subject. Among previous researches, Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) laid a foundation for the flight network revenue management. They formulated the flight network revenue management problem as a dynamic program with remaining time and inventory as the state variables. This idea, taken by Adelman (2007), Cooper (2002) , van Ryzin (1998, 1999) , Topaloglu (2009) and others, is also adopted in this paper.
In most earlier models, people assume that the demand over different itineraries are independent. However, in practice, passengers choose from all itinerary/price combinations available to them according to certain choice behaviors, and the demand functions over different itineraries might be highly correlated. Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) proposed a choice-based revenue management model and proposed the idea of offering a "product set" at each time period. Several properties of optimal solutions were examined in their work. Later, Liu and van Ryzin (2008) extended this model to network case and propose a decomposition method to solve it. Several more researches worked on how to obtain a good solution for this model, see, e.g., Miranda Bront et al. (2009) , Kunnumkal and Topaloglu (2010), van Ryzin and Vulcano (2008) , Zhang and Cooper (2005) . In some sense, our work can be viewed as a special case of the model in Liu and van Ryzin (2008) , where the "product set" contains a certain connecting flight for each O-D pair at a certain price, and in addition to the traditional customer choice behavior, we add "hidden-city" ticketing as one choice of the passenger. Although sharing the same framework, this distinguishing consideration make our analysis more focused and many interesting results can be drawn.
Recently, many works on revenue management consider the competition between different players. This is very realistic given the fact that internet search engines have enabled people to compare prices offered by different airlines very conveniently. Gallego and Hu (2000) proposed a game theoretic model for a single product revenue management problem. They considered a continuous-time fluid model and showed that Nash equilibrium exists for both an open-loop and a close-loop case. In another paper, Lin and Sibdari (2009) considered a discrete-time model and showed similar results. In our paper, we first prove that in general, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists for the network revenue management game, and show that our exogenous competitive model considered throughout the paper can be viewed as a special case when all other players are playing their equilibrium strategies. This result justifies our model to draw our above findings and may be of independent interest for further studies of competitive flight networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our model for the flight network revenue management and set up a dynamic programming formulation for the model. In Section 3, we analyze the optimal pricing strategy and show that the hidden-city ticketing opportunity can arise in this model. Then in Section 4, we construct the airlines' optimization problem when hidden-city ticketing is admitted and passengers take advantage of it whenever possible. In Section 5, we study the effect on airlines' revenues due to the hidden-city practice. We show that the optimal revenue must decrease and it could decrease by a half but no more. In Section 6, we study the impact on the fares when the airlines optimally react to hidden-city ticketing and discuss the long term impact of such ticketing practice. In Section 7, we use a game theoretic approach to justify our model. We present some numerical results to illustrate our study in Section 8 and we conclude in Section 9.
Network Revenue Management Model
We consider an airline network consisting of N cities (the set of city is denoted by N ) and define E to be all the flight legs this airline serves and O to be all the O-D pairs served using these legs. The airline sells tickets on this network and the goal is to maximize its revenue over the whole flight network.
Assume there is a fixed inventory on each flight leg, which we use a vector c to denote. We consider a discrete time model with T periods indexed backwards. That is, we start from time T and all flights depart at time 0. At each time t, the airline has to make the following decisions for each O-D pair it serves (when it is searched by a certain customer):
1. Which route to provide, i.e., which connection node (or a direct flight) to provide; 2. What price to offer for that itinerary; In our study, for the first question, we allow the airline to provide this passenger any possible 1-stop itineraries or a direct flight. Specifically, we don't consider itineraries with two or more stops (this simplifying assumption is reasonable since an itinerary with 2 or more stops are rarely attractive). For the second question, we assume that the airline offers a price p t ij . In the following, we consider an exogenous competition environment, that is, when p t ij is offered, a customer with this request will choose this product with probability λ
2 . This function can be quite general, for example, it could be a choice function based on the competitor's price (e.g., a multinomial logit demand function). However, we assume that λ t ij is known in advance. Given the historical data and future forecasts an airline typically has, this assumption may not be too unrealistic. In Section 7, we justify this assumption through a study of this problem from a game theoretical point of view. Now we formulate this problem into a dynamic programming problem. As mentioned above, we consider a discrete time model with T period. We use V t (x) to denote the optimal expected revenue when there are t periods left and the inventory level is x. We assume the arrival rate for the O-D pair i → j at time t is η t ij , and that t is defined finely enough such that there is at most one arrival during each time period. At each period, the decision of the airline is a mapping from all O-D pairs in O to a pair (k ∈ N , p), where a mapping from (i, j) ∈ O to (k t ij , p t ij ) means that the airline will serve the O-D pair (i, j) through a connection at k t ij , and asking for a price p t ij . We use k t ij = 0 to denote a direct flight. First, we consider the case where every passenger's purchase choice is only dependent by the prices of the O-D pair he travels, and is independent of the prices for other O-D pairs. This is the case when hidden-city ticketing is legally or contractually prohibited or the passengers voluntarily don't use such ticketing strategy (e.g., passengers are not aware of such strategy). In this case, a dynamic programming model for the optimal decisions for the airlines can be formulated as follows:
with boundary conditions V 0 (x) = 0 ∀x, 
is maximized. However, even with such a structure, to solve the exact dynamic programming (1) is usually computationally intractable, since the state space is huge. Several heuristics have been proposed to approximately solve this problem, see, e.g., Adelman (2007), Zhang and Adelman (2009) . In those approaches, people approximate the value functions by assuming some parametric structures of them, solve the dynamic programming using this structure and use the approximate value functions to make the current pricing decision. We refer the readers to those references for the details of those algorithms. Now we make some assumptions on the demand functions. We will use these assumptions frequently in the later discussions. Assumption 1. For any (i, j) ∈ O and any t,
is quasiconcave in p and there exists a unique maximizer for
Note that these assumptions are quite mild. The first two assumptions are some basic regularity conditions. The last one guarantees that there is always a unique optimal price for any specific itinerary. These assumptions are also made in previous literatures, e.g., Gallego and Hu (2000) . Specifically, we show that the most commonly-used demand function based on multinomial logit (MNL) choice model satisfies Assumption 1.
. It is easy to see that it satisfies the first two requirements of Assumption 1. For the last requirement, we have
Note that −αβ(p − c) + α + exp(−βp) is decreasing in p and it has a unique root on (c, ∞). Therefore, λ(p)(p − c) is quasiconcave in p and there is a unique maximizer on (c, ∞).
In the following section, we show that the hidden-city opportunity can exist in the above model if there is a significant difference in price elasticity of demand on two itineraries. This finding gives a quantitative explanation of this phenomenon.
Cause of Hidden-City Phenomenon
In this section, we study the cause of hidden-city opportunity. Assume the airline prices its products according to model (1) . As has been shown in Section 2, at each time period, the decision maker chooses k t ij and p t ij according to (2) and (3) . Fixk
. Then the optimal price for the O-D pair i → j at time t is determined by:
In the following, we omit the subscripts/superscripts for the simplicity of notation. Also we assume that Assumption 1 holds. By the optimality condition, at optimalp, we have:
Dividep on both side, we have
where E(p) is the price elasticity of demand of this O-D pair at price p. Suppose hidden-city opportunity exists on the route i → j → k, i.e., for the O-D pair i → j, the airline offers a flight with price p ij (either direct or 1-stop), and for another O-D pair i → k, the airline offers a connecting flight with connection at j, however, the prices satisfy p ik < p ij . In the following, we use subscript 1 to denote the corresponding parameters for the O-D pair i → j and 2 to denote the corresponding parameters for the O-D pair i → k. By the above argument,p 1 andp 2 satisfy:
where
. However, we have
where the first inequality is because the choice of k t ij over a direct flight in the offer for the O-D pair i → j (or equal if k t ij = 0) and the second inequality is because the monotonicity of V t (x) in x (which is not hard to show and the reader is referred to Gallego and van Ryzin (1997) and Lemma 1 in Section 4 for the detail). Therefore, we have c 1 ≤ c 2 . Then combined with the assumption that p 1 >p 2 , we obtain that E 1 (p 1 ) > E 2 (p 2 ) (and since the price elasticity are all negative, we have
In what follows, we ignore the signs in elasticities and use the word "larger" to mean larger in absolute value). We have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If j
* is a hidden-city such that a direct flight from i to j * is more expensive than a connecting flight from i to another city k with connection at j * . Then we must have the price elasticity of demand on the O-D pair i → k is greater that the price elasticity of demand on the O-D pair i → j * .
The result states that the difference in price elasticity of demand is a necessary condition for the hidden-city phenomenon. The converse is not true. The occurrence of a hidden-city opportunity also depends on the magnitude of this difference and the value of the extra leg. It might also vary with time. Note that this result is consistent with the discussions in previous literatures. For example, in GAO (2001) , the authors write "hidden-city opportunities may arise when a greater amount of competition exists for travel between spoke communities than on routes to and from hub communities". When competition is greater, as classical economic theory explains, the price elasticity of demand will be larger (at optimal price), which will result in a relatively lower optimal price for that product. Although simple, this economic theory gives a condition for the occurrence of hidden-city opportunity and illustrates this somewhat strange phenomenon.
In the following sections, we study how the airlines will react if all the passengers take advantage of this pricing structure and what impact the hidden-city ticketing practice would have on the revenues of the airlines.
Optimal Reaction when Hidden-City Ticketing are Used
In this section, we assume all the passengers are network strategic, that is, they exploit all the hidden-city opportunities in ticketing. More precisely, when purchasing airline tickets for O-D pair i → j, the passenger searches for all O-D pairs i → l with k il = j 3 . Then he compares the cheapest price to the price offered to the O-D pair i → j. If the former one is cheaper, the passenger will purchase this hidden-city ticket without letting the airline know his true intention. We first show that when all passengers are network strategic, the airline's revenue could be severely affected if the airline keeps its original pricing. Then in the rest of this section, we develop models for airlines to optimally react to hidden-city ticketing practices. We start from the following example: Example 1. (If airlines don't react) Consider a very simple two-city network as shown in Figure  1 . The only two O-D pairs the airline serves are from A to B and A to C with connection at B, and there is no demand from B to C. We assume there is only 1 period left before departure and there is only 1 inventory on both A → B and B → C leg. In the following, we first consider a series of cases where the demand functions are not continuous (a piecewise constant), however, we can use continuous functions to approximate them with arbitrary degree of accuracy. Therefore the results will also hold for continuous demand functions. Let the demand functions be:
and
where c < 0.1, x 100 are constants chosen beforehand. We assume η AB = η AC = 1 in this period. Then we have the optimal pricing without consideration of hidden-city ticketing will be to offer 100 for O-D pair A → C and x for O-D pair A → B and the optimal expected revenue will be 10 + 100c.
However, if hidden-city ticketing is used by the passengers, then the airline's revenue is 1000
By choosing x sufficiently large and c sufficiently small (and use a continuous function to approximate λ AB and λ AC ), the ratio between (9) and (8) can be made arbitrarily close to 0. Therefore, if the airlines don't react to the hidden-city ticketing, the revenue can be severely hurt.
In the rest of this section, we study how an airline should react to hidden-city ticketing. We establish another dynamic programming decision model for the network strategic passengers. This model will be the foundation for our analysis in the following sections.
We use similar notations as in (1) and useV to denote the value function when hidden-city ticketing is used. In this case, the airline's optimization problem when facing inventory x at time t becomes:V
The boundary conditions are the same as before. HereĀ This makes it even harder to find the optimal policy for this problem. Before discussing how to solve (10), we show some properties about the solution in this case. We start from a lemma about the monotonicity of the value functionV . Lemma 1. For any t, any vector x ≥ y (we define all vector inequality as componentwise), we havē
We omit the proof of this lemma and go to our theorem.
Theorem 1.
There exists a solution to (10) that does not contain any hidden-city opportunity, i.e., when all passengers take advantage of such opportunities, the best response of the airlines will not contain any such opportunity.
Proof. We prove by contradiction. Assume the optimal pricing policy for (10) still contains hiddencity opportunities. Then there exists city i and j (hidden-city) such that
Next we discuss four cases and show that we can always modify the current pricing policy to obtain one with at least the same revenue and the hidden-city opportunity is eliminated. 1. k t ij = 0. In this case, we just lower the price p t ij top t ij . Then for the right hand side of (10), the only thing changed isĀ t ij and it is decreased. Therefore, by Lemma 1, the expected revenue weakly increases.
2.
is not a hidden-city in the solution to (10). In this case, instead of offering the route i → k t ij → j for the O-D pair i to j, we offer a direct flight from i to j with pricẽ p
Comparing this new pricing policy to the original one, the only term in (10) that changed is for the O-D pair i to j. However, the valueV
weakly increases in the new pricing policy since the new policy only consumes one unit of leg ij while the old one consumes one unit of leg ij and jk t ij . Meanwhile, the effective price for the O-D pair i → j remains the same. Therefore, the new pricing policy achieves a weakly higher revenue than the old one.
3. k t ij is also a hidden-city in the solution to (10) but the cheapest route for traveling from i to k t ij
Then by the same argument as the previous case, we claim that this modification achieves weakly higher revenue.
4. k t ij is also a hidden-city and the route i → k t ij → j is the cheapest route to travel from i to k t ij (or more precisely, p • For (i, j), the effective price is the same as the original pricing policy (p t ij ), but the consumption of the inventory is lower (changed from i → j →k t ij to i → j), thus according to Lemma 1 there is an weakly increase in revenue from that term;
• For (i, k t ij ), the effective price is the same as the original policy (p t ij ), but the consumption of the inventory is lower (changed from i → k t ij → j to i → k t ij ), thus there is an weakly increase in revenue from that term;
• For all O-D pairs, the price and inventory consumption are the same. To summarize, if there is a hidden-city opportunity in the network, there is always a modification to the prices such that the revenue can be weakly improved. Also note that the above modification can be terminated in finite steps, since at each step, the modification only modifies some prices in the network to a lower price also existed in the network. And when this modification terminates, there must be no hidden-city opportunities in the network and the revenue has been weakly improved. Thus the theorem is proved. . Although Theorem 1 is intuitive, it is an important result for our further study. A direct result will be a simplification of the dynamic program in (10)-(13). According to Theorem 1, the dynamic program forV t (x) can be equivalently written as:
Comparing to the dynamic program in (1), the only difference in (15) is that it has some additional constraints. Obviously, (15) is very hard to solve and one would still need to resort to approximation schemes to solve it. One possible method is to use the approximate technique proposed in Zhang and Adelman (2009) to approximate the value functions. Then, in order to find out the optimal p t ij and k t ij , one can search among all connecting possibilities (polynomial time), solve the corresponding constrained optimization (using the approximate value functionV t−1 (·) and compare the optimal values. Since our main emphasis is to explore interesting properties from the solution, the detail solving method for (15) is beyond our discussion. It will be one direction of future research to obtain good way to solve this problem.
In the next section, we will use the model proposed above to derive important bounds on the airlines' revenues when hidden-city opportunities are taken by every passenger.
Bounds on Revenues
In this section, we compare the airlines' optimal revenue when hidden-city ticketing is not used to that if hidden-city ticketing is fully admitted and every passenger takes advantage of it whenever possible, i.e., the optimal value of (1) to the optimal value of (10). Intuitively, the revenue will decrease because when hidden-city ticketing is used, the passengers are essentially playing against the airlines. We will first formalize this intuition. Then we show that the loss is bounded up to half of its original revenue when the airline uses a hub-and-spoke network structure. Although this bound is loose, it is so far the first explicit bound for the revenue loss due to this ticketing practice. Moreover, we show that this bound is actually tight, i.e., there exists a case (a hub-and-spoke network) such that the loss equals to half of the original revenue. These results provide a detailed analysis on the loss to the airlines when hidden-city opportunities are fully taken by the passengers.
We first prove that the revenue always decreases when hidden-city ticketing is used. We prove the following theorem:
Proof. We prove by induction on t. The result is obvious for t = 0 for all x. Assume it is true for all s = t − 1 for all x, then for time t, we have by (1) and (15):
By induction assumption, the right hand side of (17) is less than that ifV t−1 (x) is replaced by V t−1 (x). And it is also with more constraints. Thus the theorem holds.
The above results also follow from an alternative formulation of this problem. The alternative formulation, although not directly useful in computing the optimal strategy, will provide an insight of the relationship between (1) and (10).
We start from writing V t (x) in (1) as the optimal value of the following optimization problem:
Here q t ijk (x) is the "indicator variable" of which route to provide. It is easy to see that at optimality, q t ijk (x) will be all either 0 or 1. Similarly, we could also writeV t (x) in (15) as the optimal value of the following optimization problem:
In this case, we can also easily argue that at optimality, q t ijk (x) is all either 0 or 1. Therefore, (19) is equivalent to (15). However, the only difference between (18) and (19) is that (19) has more constraints (p
Therefore, it is clear that Theorem 2 holds. Theorem 2 states that by admitting hidden-city ticketing, the airlines will indeed incur losses. In the following, we study the magnitude of loss that can be incurred. We first define some terms which will be useful in our later discussions. Definition 1. (Pricing Network): At any time t, we define the current pricing network P N to be the set of (p We also call j a hidden-city in this pricing network P N . We denote all the Hidden-City Pair in a network by H.
Definition 3.
(Hidden-City Branch): We define a hidden-city branch in a pricing network P N to be a Hidden-City Pair (i, j) along with the set of all cities l s , s = 1, ..., n such that k t ils = j and p t ij > p t ils . We denote all the hidden-city branches in a network by B. And we call all l s in this case the final destinations of the hidden-city pair (i, j). Now we make the following assumption of our pricing network at any time.
Assumption 2. (Destination of Hidden-City is not a Hub):
The final destinations of hidden-city pairs are not used as connection at any time. To be more precise, assume the pricing network P N is the pricing network solved from (1) at some time. If l s is a final destination of a hidden-city pair of P N , then l s is not used as a connection point in P N .
The assumption that the destinations of hidden-city pairs are not connection points seems quite strong, however it is quite reasonable in practice. In practice, the hidden-city is usually a hub and the destinations of hidden-city pairs are usually non-hub cities. Therefore, the destinations of hidden-city pairs will usually not be connection points since in such network, nearly all connections take place in the hub (in fact, there may not be outbound flights from the destinations of hiddencity pairs other than towards hub cities). Next we show that the most-common used hub-and-spoke network satisfies Assumption 2.
Definition 4.
(Hub-and-Spoke Network) We call a flight network a hub-and-spoke network if the cities in this network are divided into two classes: "hubs" and "non-hubs" (spokes). The flights between spokes and hubs are direct and flights between spoke cities are connected at one of the hubs.
As many studies suggest, most major airlines in the United States (as well as many small airlines) adopt a hub-and-spoke network strategy nowadays, because of its efficiency and capability to serve more O-D pairs. We have: Proposition 3. Any hub-and-spoke network satisfies Assumption 2.
Therefore, Assumption 2 is quite mild in practice. With this assumption, we prove the following theorem showing that the optimal revenue when hidden-city ticketing is used is within a factor of 2 to the optimal revenue when it is not used. Proof. Our proof is by induction. At each time t , we construct a modification to the optimal prices of (1) such that it satisfies the constraints in (15) and the revenue is at least a half. We refer to Appendix A for the detail proof. Theorem 3 shows that by allowing hidden-city ticketing, the revenue can be reduced by at most a half (under Assumption 1 and 2). The following counterexample shows that this bound is tight, that is, in certain cases, allowing hidden-city ticket will indeed reduce the optimal revenue by half.
Example 2. (The revenue can be reduced by half) We consider the same example as in Example 1 with c = 0.1. Then we have the optimal pricing without hidden-city ticketing will be pricing 100 for O-D pair A → C and x for O-D pair A → B and the optimal expected revenue will be 20. However, if hidden-city ticketing is permitted, it can be shown that the optimal pricing strategy will be to price 100 on both O-D pairs and the expected revenue is 10 + 1000/x. By choosing x sufficiently large (And use a continuous function to approximate λ AB and λ AC ), the ratio can be made arbitrarily close to 1/2.
In this section, we showed that when hidden-city ticketing is admitted and used by all passengers, the revenues of the airlines always decrease, comparing to the optimal revenue when hidden-city ticketing is not used. We also showed that the decrement can be as much as half of the original optimal revenue, but it can not be more if the airline takes a hub-and-spoke network. In the next section, we discuss another important aspects, i.e., how the prices will change when airlines react to hidden-city ticketing. We will still use model (15) to conduct our analysis.
Resulting Price Changes and the Long Term Effects
In the previous sections, we studied the effect on the airlines' revenue when hidden-city ticketing is used by the passengers. We showed that the airlines always suffer a loss even if they optimally react (by changing the prices) to such a ticketing practice. Therefore, the use of hidden-city opportunities, if not controlled, does hurt the airlines. Thus the airlines do have the incentive to forbid such ticketing tricks. On the other hand, given such opportunities, the travelers have the incentive to take advantage of them since it instantly saves their money. But this may not be true for the travelers in the long run. American Airlines hints in one of its letter to their customers 4 that "If American Airlines continues to lose revenue as a result of hidden-city transactions, the fares we charge must inevitably rise". Similar statements are also made by other airlines as well as in some literatures studying this phenomenon. In this section, we will study how the optimal prices change when hidden-city ticketing is taken into account in pricing. Specifically, will the prices increase? Answering this question will be instrumental to study the long term impact of this practice to the passengers and to help decision makers to make wise decisions on this controversial issue.
We start by considering a single period case. i.e., we consider model (1) but allow hidden-city ticketing in the first time period (time period t). We study how the prices change in that first period in the optimal reaction of the airlines.
We use p t ij to denote the optimal prices for (1) andp t ij to denote the optimal prices when hidden-city ticketing is used in the first time period. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Let Assumption 1 and 2 hold. Consider any hidden-city pair (i, j) defined in Definition 2, and any destination l of this hidden-city pair. Then
Remark 1. Theorem 4 states that the fares between the hidden-city pair will decrease and the fares from the origin to the destinations of the hidden-city pair will increase if hidden-city ticketing is to be used by the passengers. The latter part of this finding, although only considers a one-period model, is consistent with the empirical discussions in the previous literatures. For example, in GAO (2001) , the authors conclude "... if legislation required airlines to permit hidden-city ticketing, airfares in certain markets (i.e., for travel between certain spoke communities connecting over a hub) could increase immediately... ". And as a result, the demand to the spoke cities will drop and "airlines would consider reducing or eliminating service on these markets". When this happens, the benefits gained in the second half of Theorem 4 will disappear and all prices will be above the original prices (or the service is halted). Clearly, this whole sequence of effect is both adverse to the airlines as well as to the passengers.
Before we prove Theorem 4, we prove the following technical lemma.
Lemma 2. Let Assumption 1 holds. Then for any c 2 ≥ c 1 ,
Proof. By the optimality condition, we have
Therefore, since λ (p) ≤ 0, we have while maintaining all other prices, the revenue will increase. First, we argue that doing this won't create any new hidden-city opportunity for the pricing network (p,k). This is true because by Theorem 1, we know that the pricing network (p,k) doesn't contain any hidden-city opportunity. And by Assumption 2, l can not be used as a connection point. Therefore, increase the fare to l won't create any hiddencity opportunity in this network. Then we show that the revenue would increase. This is because p 
Since k 
we know that the revenue would increase if we lowerp t ij in this case. Now we have shown the way prices will change in the single-period model. It is tempting to extend this result to the full multi-period model, i.e., comparing p t ij in (1) and (10). Intuitively, prices to the hidden-city destination should still increase and the prices between the hidden-city pair should decrease. However, as the following example shows, this is not always the case, even the pair of city is a hidden-city pair for all the periods forward. Figure 3 (the graph is the same as in Example 1) .
At the beginning of period 2, the inventory level is x = (1, 1) where the first entry denotes the inventory on the the flight leg A → B and the second entry denotes the inventory on the flight leg B → C. There are only demands for the itinerary A → B and A → C in both period. AC (p) = 1 − p/100 (The demand functions are only defined on the range where it is positive, otherwise it is zero. It is easy to verify that it satisfies Assumption 1 with a slight modification to guarantee differentiability, which doesn't affect our analysis). With these parameters, for the case when hidden-city ticketing is not used, we have the optimal price p (1, 1)) = 40/3. Note that these prices satisfy the result in Theorem 4 since it is the last period. Now we consider the following parameters for the second to last period (t = 2). We define η 1) ) = 23.0269 (this also verifies the relationship between V andV as stated in Theorem 2 and 3). Note that the optimal prices on both legs decrease in this case. This is because that the optimal value of one period also changes with the value functions of future periods. And when hidden-city opportunity is taken by the passengers, the value functions of future periods may change in a way that the resulting changes in price is in a different direction as Theorem 4 predicts.
However, as one can see, the above example is not really well-behaved because of the big difference in η we designed to make our example work. In practice, one may expect that when hidden-city opportunity is taken by the passengers, the optimal fares towards the destination of hidden-city pair will increase, and the consequences in Remark 1 will take place. In the long run, it is detrimental to both the airlines and the consumers, creating a lose-lose situation.
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A Game-Theoretic Approach
In the previous sections, we have considered an exogenous competition model in which we assume there is a known demand function λ t ij (p t ij ) when an airline posts a price p t ij for the O-D pair i → j. In reality, there are endogenous competitions between airlines and the customer's choice is a function of all the prices posted by different airlines. This is especially true since the emergence of internet travel search engines which enable consumers to compare prices of difference airlines conveniently. In this section, we consider a game theory model where the demand function is jointly determined by all the prices posted by different airlines. We show that there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for this game under a strong information structure. We then relate this model to our previous discussions and show that our previous discussions can be viewed as a simplified case when all the other players play their equilibrium strategies. In this section, we assume that no hidden-city ticketing is admitted, therefore, the customer's choice for one O-D pair only depends on all prices offered by different airlines on this O-D pair.
We start from defining the information structure in the game. A similar definition can be found in Gallego and Hu (2000) and Lin and Sibdari (2009) for the single product case. This strong information structure, although appears strong, is attainable in the current industry practice. Nowadays, many travel search websites offer features of previewing seat availability maps for each flight leg so that the real-time inventory can be deemed as public information. Under this information structure, at the beginning of each time period, each airline first observes the inventory levels of all other competitors, and makes the decision of its offering price.
Before discussing the Nash equilibrium, we need to define more notations. In the following, we use letter r in parenthesis to denote the rth player, and "−r" to denote all the other players. Specifically, we denote the price the rth airline chooses at time t for O-D pair i → j by p t(r) ij , the connection city this airline chooses by k t(r) ij . Also in this case, the demand function will be dependent on all other airlines' prices on this O-D pair, which we denote by λ t(r) ij (p t(r) ij , p t(−r) ij ). Then the value function V (r) t (x (r) , x (−r) ) for player r at time t with inventory x (r) and other airlines' inventory x (−r) has the following dynamic programming representation (other notations remain the same as in (1)):
At each time period, given all other firms' choices (and observe the inventory of all airlines), the airline picks p t(r) ij and k t(r) ij to maximize V (r)
t (x (r) , x (−r) ). To prove that there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for this multi-period game, we use an induction method (which is also used in Lin and Sibdari (2009) to prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the single product pricing game). First, at time 0, all the value functions are equal to 0, thus any pure policy will be a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and V (r) 0 (x) = 0 are the expected revenues under the equilibrium policy, for all r and x. Now consider any time period t, and denote the current inventory vector by x. By induction assumption, a purestrategy Nash equilibrium exists for all periods 1, 2, ..., t − 1, which means that for any inventory level y and s ≤ t − 1, there exists an equilibrium policy (p * , k * ) (not necessarily unique, we pick arbitrary one in the case when there are multiple equilibriums). We denote the expected revenue obtained by equilibrium policy at time s ≤ t − 1 and inventory level y byV s (y) = (V (r) s (y)) m r=1 . Note then each airline's optimization problem at period t can be represented as (24) with the value functions on the right hand side replaced by the expected revenueV 's. Then it is easy to see that for every O-D pair i → j, the optimal connection decision is to offer the route k t(r) ij with the highest
ij , x (−r) ); and to offer p t(r) ij 's to maximize
ij . In order to prove the existence of Nash equilibrium, we make the following assumptions to the demand functions:
) is quasi-concave in p . Then it satisfies Assumption 3.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Lin and Sibdari (2009) . We take derivative to Φ r ij (p (r) ). We have (we omit the subscript i, j in p for convenience)
Then note that the expression in the bracket is monotonically decreasing in p (r) . Therefore, the original function could have at most one point at which the derivative is zero, therefore, Φ r ij (p (r) ) must be quasi-concave in p (r) . And for the upper bound of the maximizer, it is not hard to see from (26) that any stationary point of Φ r ij (p (r) ) (necessary condition for a maximizer) must be less than C 1 ij + (1 + q exp (α q ))/β. Therefore, the theorem holds. We will use the following theorem from Vives (1999) and Debreu (1952) to prove the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in our model.
Theorem 5. Consider a game. If the strategy sets are nonempty convex and compact subsets of Euclidean space and the payoff to player i is continuous in the actions for all firms and quasiconcave in its own action, then there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
With Theorem 5 and the discussions above, we have Theorem 6. If Assumption 3 holds, then there exists at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in each period in this multi-period game defined in (24). Corollary 1. Under a multinomial logit (MNL) choice model for the consumers, there exists at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium for the airlines in this multi-period game defined in (24).
In the following discussion, we assume that Assumption 3 holds, therefore, there exists a purestrategy Nash equilibrium in this game. We argue that our original model of exogenous competition can be viewed as a simplified case when every player plays its equilibrium strategy.
The relation is established by comparing the dynamic program in (1) and that in (24). To equate those two, first we have to assume that all other players play their equilibrium prices, which removes the dependence of λ(·) on the prices of other airlines. Then we need to make a modification to the value functions by redefining V t (x) by:
) .
In the above transformations, the first two are natural. The last one, although looks complicated, is just a modification to the original function with consideration of the changes in other competitors' inventory, under the expectation that all other competitors use the equilibrium pricing strategy. The equilibrium analysis justifies our exogenous optimization model, a modification of the competitive market model, used to establish all the results in the preceding sections.
Numerical Results
In this section, we perform numerical experiments to illustrate our previous studies. We consider a small hub-and-spoke network with four cities and three flight legs as shown in Figure 4 . We assume there are only demands from A to B, A to C and A to D. And flights from A to C and D are connected at B. We assume the capacity on the flight legs A → B ,B → C, B → D are 70, 20 and 25 respectively and there are totally 400 time periods before departure.
In our numerical study, we assume that the arrival rates for each O-D pair is 0.25 and doesn't change with time, that is η t AB = η t AC = η t AD = 0.25. And we define the demand function λ using the mulitnomial logit (MNL) model as follows: Figure 4 A Small Flight Network.
In our experiments, we define α 2 = 1, α 3 = 1.5, β 1 = 0.01, β 2 = 0.01 and β 3 = 0.008. Then we choose different values of α 1 to see the effect of different market environments on the hidden-city opportunities on this network. Note that a smaller α 1 means that the traveler has a higher chance to choose this flight when it is being requested, and the market competition on the O-D pair A → B is relatively low. The opposite is true when α 1 is large. In our experiments, we choose α 1 to be 0.05, 0.1, 0.25, 0.35, 0.5 and 1. The computation results are shown in Table 1 .
In Table 1 , V * is the optimal revenue when hidden-city ticketing is not used, i.e., the optimal value of the dynamic program (1) . In the third and fourth row,Ṽ is the revenue obtained by using the policy solved by (1) , however, all passengers take advantage of hidden-city opportunities whenever possible.V is the revenue obtained by the optimal response of the airlines when hiddencity ticketing is admitted and used by all passengers, i.e., the optimal value of the dynamic program (15). In the next six rows, p * shows the optimal prices for the three O-D pairs at the first time period (t = 400) when hidden-city ticketing is not used; andp shows the corresponding optimal prices when passengers use hidden-city opportunities. The letter "H" in the parenthesis identifies hidden-city opportunities on the price network. And since the size of this problem is relatively small, the numbers in Table 1 are all solved from the exact dynamic program, not from an approximation.
In Table 1 , we can see that when competition between origin A and hub B is relatively low comparing to that between origin A and spokes C and D (i.e., when α 1 is small), there could be hidden-city opportunities existing in this network. And the revenue of the airline will be reduced when passengers take advantage of such opportunities. When airlines optimally react to this ticketing method, the loss can be reduced but the revenue is still less than that when hidden-city ticketing is not used. These results are consistent with Theorem 2 and 3, however, it hints that in practice, the decrease of revenue may be much smaller than the worst case scenario indicated in Theorem 3. With the competition on the O-D pair A → B increases (i.e., when α 1 increases), the hidden-city opportunity becomes less significant, and the revenue difference becomes smaller. We plot this change in Figure 5 . When certain level of competition is reached on leg A → B, the hidden-city opportunity will partially (α 1 = 0.35) or completely (α 1 = 0.5) disappear. This is also Table 1 Revenues and optimal prices with/without hidden-city ticketing
Figure 5
Relationship between α1 and the revenue loss in accordance with our discussion in Section 3 in which we claim that the price elasticity of demand is the main reason to cause hidden-city opportunity. Lastly, we look at the optimal pricing reactions of the airlines when hidden-city ticketing is admitted and all passengers take advantage of it. First, we see from Table 1 that the optimal reactions of the airlines will not contain any hidden-city opportunities, which is consistent with Theorem 1. Also, as stated in Theorem 4, the fares towards the destination of hidden-city pairs would increase and the fares towards the hub would decrease. This is also verified in our numerical results. Besides, our results provide an intuition of how to modify the optimal prices of the original problems to obtain the optimal prices when hidden-city ticketing is used.
Conclusion
In this paper, we build, for the first time, a mathematical model to study the hidden-city ticketing phenomenon in airline ticket pricing. We consider a dynamic flight network revenue management model under which the hidden-city opportunities could arise when there is a large difference in the price elasticity in different O-D pairs. We show that if passengers take advantage of the hidden-city opportunity whenever possible, the airlines had better to react in price, otherwise their revenues could be severely reduced. Then we study the optimal reaction of the airlines towards this ticketing practice. We first show that the optimal reaction of the airlines will no longer contain any hiddencity opportunity. However, even with the optimal reaction, the airline's revenue will still be reduced, and the reduction could be as much as half of the original optimal revenue but not more. We also proved that in the optimal reaction, the fares to the spoke cities would increase and therefore, practicing hidden-city ticketing would also hurt the passengers in the long run.
Our results suggest that hidden-city ticketing needs to be dealt with, since it could be detrimental to both parties. Ideally, passengers could be aware of the long term effects of such practice, and therefore voluntarily give up such opportunities. However, for a single passenger, his interest may be quite limited to a cheaper one-time travel and thus will not consider the long term consequences at all. Another possibility is to use contracts/warnings to bind the behaviors of the passengers, which is mainly carried out in current practice. But the enforcement of those contracts/warnings is doubtful. If all those measures fail to prevent passengers from taking such opportunities, the airlines may need to change its current pricing structures. In practice, a mixed strategy of contractually prohibiting and optimal responding may be the most appropriate, and the mixture depends on each specific route and how many passengers will choose to conduct hidden-city transactions. As we have shown in our discussions, these are all very important issues to the airlines as well as to the whole industry. We hope that this paper could provide a starting point for further studies and complete solution of this problem. 
where the second inequality is because the case assumption (31) and that λ
where a ∨ b = max(a, b). To illustrate, we choose p such that the arrival rate is the same as before. 
where the first equality is by grouping the terms and applying equation (34). The second inequality is because the induction assumption and reorganizing terms. The third inequality is because the case assumption (33) and that 
In (39), the first inequality is because of equation (15), the second inequality is because the above discussion on each term in the hidden-city branch combined with all those terms that don't appear in the hidden-city branch. The third inequality is because we assumed that p t ij and k t ij are the optimal solutions to (1) . And the last inequality is because we assume the time window is small enough such that only one arrival may appear in each period.
Theorem 3 then follows.
